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[L. A. No. 29534. In Bank. Nov. 18, 1968.] 
ATLANTIC OIL COMPANY et a1., Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et a1., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
HUMBLE OIL & REFINING COMPANY et a1., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, v. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
(Consolidated Cases.) 
[L. A. No. 29535. In Bank. Nov. 18, 1968.] 
HAMMIL OIL CORPORATION et a!., Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., Defendants and 
Respondents. 
[la, Ib] Oil-Na.ture of Property in OiI.-The owner of land does 
not have an absolute title to oil and gas in place as corporeal 
property, but, rather, the exclusive right on his premises to 
drill for oil and gas, and to retain as his property all sub-
stances brought to the surface on his land; thus under instru-
ments denominated as leases, orders, or permits, each public 
entity executing the same granted the privilege of drilling for 
and producing oil and gas exclusively to a lessee without res-
ervation or exception for the term of the lease, a profit a 
prendre, a right to remove a part of the substance of the land, 
, and received tbe right to specified oil and gas royalty pay-
\ ments, a right classified as an incorporeal hereditament, an 
interest in land, where each instrument conveyed to a lessee 
the exclusive right to drill for and extract oil, gas, and other 
hydrocarbons from beneath specified publicly owned land, 
together with necessary surface occupancy and access rights, 
[lJ Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, notes, 101 
A.L.R. 884, 131 A.L.R. 1371. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Oil and Gas, 
§ 3 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Gas and Oil, § 3 et seq. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Oil, § 2; [2] Estates, § 1; [3] Taxa-
tion, § 53; (4, 5, 7, 9, 25, 26] Taxation, § 59; [6] Taxation § 60 ; 
(8] Statutes, §180(2); [10,12,13,21] Taxation, §191(1); [11] 
Taxation, § 186; [14] Landlord and Tenant, § 139 ; Words and 
Phrases; (15, 17] Oil, § 30; [16] Oil, §§ 29, 30; [18] Oil, § 28; 
(19] Cotenancy, § 31; [20] Oil, § 17; [22] Taxation, § 288(2) ; 
[23] Cotenancy, § 12; [24] Cotenancy, § 13; [27] Taxation, § 288 
(1). 
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and entitled the public entity to a percentage or fraction of 
production, to be taken either in kind or in cash. 
[2] Estates-Profit a Prendre.-A profit a prendre is an interest 
in real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament; 
whether utllimited as to duration or limited to a term of years, 
it is an estate in real property; if for a term of years, it is a 
chattel real, which is nevertheless an estate in real property, 
although not real property, or real estate; if unlimited in 
duration, it is a freehold interest, an estate in fee, and real 
property or real estate. 
[8] Taxation-Real Properly.-For purposes of taxation, the defi-
nitions of real property in the revenue and taxation laws of the 
state control whether or not they conform to definitions used 
for other purposes. 
[4] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Mining or Oil Interests.-Although 
classified under general concepts of property law as an incor-
poreal hereditament and an interest in lands, the right to re-
" ceive oil royalties is not classified as real property for purposes 
of taxation. 
[6] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Mining or Oil Intetests.-The right 
to receive royalties is not a right appertaining to minerals 
"in the land," but rather, an interest in oil and gas when they 
are removed from the land and reduced to possession; the pur-
pose" of the qualifying phrase "in the land," as used in Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 104, defining real property to include "all minerals 
in the land" is to differentiate royalty interests in extraeted 
minerals from interests in minerals still in the land, and only 
the latter, which include the right to drill for and extract oil 
and gas from the land, are real property for tax purposes. 
[6] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Possessory Rights. 
-The purpose of Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107, dealing with pos-
sessory interests in real estate, is to distinguish between those 
possessory interests that must be placed on the unsecured roll 
and such interests that must be placed on the secured roll; 
and a nonoperating oil royalty nonpossessory interest is not an 
incorporeal hereditament within the meaning of Rev. " Tax. 
Code, § 107. 
[7a, 7b] Id.-Real Property-Mining o.r Oil Interests.-The rule 
of contemporaneous construction may not be applied .when the 
wording of a statute or ordinance clearly calls for a different 
construction; thus an administrative interpretation that oil 
royalty interests were l·ights and privileges appertaining to 
minerals in the land within the meaning of Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 104, and taxable thereunder unless held by a tax-exempt 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 53; Am.Jur., Taxation (1st ed 
§416). 
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entity, was not binding where the wording of the statute 
clearly called for a different construction. 
[8] Statutes-Interpretation-Aid to Construction-Contempora-
neous Executive or Departmental Construction.-Although 
contemporaneous construction by officials charge<l with the 
administration of a statute or ordinance is given great weight, 
final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with 
the courts, and, at most, administrative practice is a weight in 
the scale to be considered but not to be inevitably followed. 
[9] Taxation - Real Property - Leaseholds - Oil Interests.-
A landowner's royalty interest under an oil and gas lease or 
similar agreement is not real property within the meaning of 
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 104, defining real property, and failure to 
deduct its value in assessing the interest of a lessee of tax-
exempt land does not result in imposing a tax on tax-exempt 
property. 
[10] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leaseholds.-In valuing rights 
to produce oil and gas, under leases and similar agreements 
with the owners of tax-exempt land, by the capitalization of 
income method, a generally accepted method of valuing prop-
erty from which income may be or is derived, the present value 
of the lessor's royalty interest is not to be deducted in arriving 
at a net income figure. 
[11] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Taxation 
of property at its value without regard to the owner's equity 
therein is an established principle of ad valorem taxation. 
[12] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Possessory Estates in Real 
\ 
Property.-A conditional vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at 
the full value of property as its owner even though he could 
, realize little or nothing by its sale. 
[18] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Possessory Estates in Real 
Property.-A continued enjoyment of the benefits of owner-
ship of the fee or a possessory interest is dependent on dis-
charging the obligations assumed to secure such benefits, and 
there is no logical basis for treating those obligations differ-
ently as they happen to run to a lessor, a conditional vendor, 
or a mortgagee. 
[14] Landlord and Tenant-Definition and Nature of Rent: Words 
and Phrases-"Rent."-Rent paid for a leasehold interest is 
part of the cost or purchase price of the leasehold and is a 
compensation paid for the use of land; it need not be money, 
and any chattels or products of the soil serve the purpose 
equally as well. 
[10J See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 186; Am. Jur., Taxation (1s~ 
ed §712). 
; i 
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[15] Oil-Leases-Royalties.-RoYlllty payments are a considera-
tion to the lessor for the uses of land allowed by contract; 
and under the usual oil and gus lease, the owner confers on 
the lessee for thc term of the lease an exclusive right of profit 
to drill for and produce oil, the lessee usually returning to the 
lessor for the privilege granted, a rent or royalty measured by 
a fraction of the oil produced. 
[16] Id.-Leases-Rent: Royalties.-The words "royalty" and 
"rent" are used interchangeably to convey the same meaning, 
i.e., the compensation which the occupier pays the landlord for 
that species of occupation which the contract between them 
allows; and in this respect it is immaterial that the lessor ob-
tains title to royalty oil and gas as soon as it is produced at 
the wellhead, whcreas rental payments are usually made from 
funds initially owned by the lessee. 
[17] Id.-Leases-Royalties.-The owner of land has no title to 
oil and'gas in place but only the exclusive right to produce it 
from his land; when he conveys that right to a lessee in ex-
change for the right to receive a fraction of the oil and gas 
produced, his royalty interest, like the right to receive rent 
pursuant to other kinds of leases, flows from the agreement of 
thc parties; and the fact that the oil and gas would have becn 
the lessor's personal propcrtybad there been no lease and had 
the oil and gas bel.'l1 produced by him does not change the char-
acter of his relationship with the lessee or the nature of the 
royalty payment us cOll1pensation for the use of land. 
[lSa, ISb] Id.-Cotenancy.-A city and the United States were 
tenants in common in thc exclusive right to drill for and pro-
duce oil and gas from land, where the city assigned to the 
United States 6%, percent (If thc amount or value of any oil 
and gas that might be produced from certain of its lands; 
subsequent oil and gas lessees under city leases providing for 
payment of royalties plus a percentage of net pro1l.ts after 
payout were obligated to make royalty payments to co-lessors 
instead of a single lessor, and their obligation to pay the 6% 
percent royalty to the United States constituted part of the 
consideration for their right to produce oil and gas from the 
land, although the United States did not sign the lease. 
[19] Ootenancy-Tenancy in Oommon-Lease or License by 00-
tenant.-A single cotenant may confcr occupancy rights upon 
a third person. 
[20] Oil-Leases-By Cotenant.-Wben one tenant in common 
makes an oil and gas lease, it binds. the other tenants in COln-
mon who ratify the lease, and acceptance of benefits under the 
lease constitutes ratification. 
[21J Taxation-Leaseholds-Mode of Valuation.-Royalty pay-
ments to the state under a cOlllpensatory royalty agreement 
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were compensation for interest in land and analogous to rental 
payments under the rule that in valuing an oil lease for taxa-
tion by the capitalization of income method, future rents are 
not to be deducted in arriving at a net income figure, where 
the state owned land adjacent to privately owned land 011 
which a lessee had an oil and gas lease and, under the compen-
satory royalty agreement, promised it would not drill, or per-
mit others to drill, any well for the production of oil and gas 
on its land, in return for payment of a percentage of all oil 
produced and sold from wells drilled by the lessee under its 
lease on the adjoining privately owned land, and where, under 
the compensatory royalty agreement the lessee obtained inter-
estH in the state-owned land-the right to exclude others from 
drilling any well for the production of oil and gas thereon, 
and an easement and rights-of-way over the land. 
[22a,22b] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Recovery of Taxes Paid-
Judgment.-In a suit to recover taxes based on improper as-
sessments, the trial eourt erred in holding invalid the assess-
ments of plaintiff's interests under an oil drilling and operat-
ing contract on the ground that the royalty interests there-
under should have been deducted in making the assessments. 
where the contract did not create a tenancy in eommon in the 
taxable lIIineral interests in such real property, but rather 
granted plaintiff the exclusive right to drill for and produce 
oil and gas without indicating any intent that less than a full 
profit a prendre was granted, and where the facts that the 
instrument was labeled a drilling and operating agreement 
rather than a lease, that plaintiff was labeled a contractor who 
\ 
was to be paid for services performed, and that the parties 
disclaimed any intent to grant an interest in property, did not 
cont.rol the legal effect of the instrument. 
[23] Cotenancy-Tenancy in Common-Creation of Relation.-A 
tenancy in common in a taxable mineral interest consisting of 
the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons exists only if 
both tenants have a unity of possession in the same estate, and 
the intention to create such unity of possession must clearly 
appear. 
[24] ld.-·Tenancy in Common-Creation by Conveyance, Pur-
chase or Sale.-When a landowner conveys to another the ex-
clusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons in return 
for sOllie part of the pl'oduction or its cash equivalent, he does 
not therl'hy hecome a tenant in common in the profit a prendrp, 
for he has not inllicated an intention to retain the right to 
take part in tl:e extmction of hydrocarbons. 
[26] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Mining or Oil Interests.-
An agreement to share or ret.ain title to the oil and gas re-
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duced to possession does not constitute an agreement to share 
the taxable mineral interest in the real property. 
[26] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Oil lnterests.-The provisions of 
oil and gas agreements did not indicate an intention tQ create 
a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral interests con-
sisting of the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons, but 
indicated instead an intention to grant oil companies a profit 
a prendre subject to conditions and controls retained by a 
city landowner to assure that publicly owned oil resources were 
developed in a manner that would best serve the public inter-
est, where the instruments granted a taxable mineral inter-
est exclusively to the oil companies for a period certain, with 
a reversion· thereafter to the city, and where, although the 
controls retained by the city allowed it to supervise operation 
for its own protection, they did not allow it to undertake 
such operations itself. 
[27] ld. - Remedies of Taxpayer - Recovery of Taxes Paid-
Findings.-In a suit to recover taxes based on improper assess-
ments, the trial court correctly concluded that a city land-
owner becallle a tenant in common with two oil companies 
in taxable mineral interests in the land and that the latter's 
interests should be asscsscd accordingly, where by unit agree-
ments and oil drilling and operating contracts referring to 
unitization, the city adjusted its relationship with each of the 
plaintiffs involved so that previously granted exclusive rights 
to drill for and produce oil and gas would be delegated to 
a common agent, both the city and plaintiffs involved were 
working interest owners, both voted in proportion to their 
adjusted interests and their l'elative interests in the entire 
tract cOlllmitted to unit operation, and the right to drill for 
and produce oil and gas, which comprised the taxable mineral 
interest, was no longer held exclusively by a single oil con-
tractor, but rather both plaintiffs involved and the city con-
trolled the drilling and production of oil and gas on the subject 
land in proportion to their voting rights in the unit and 
thereby subscribed to that unity of possession required to 
create a tenancy in colllmon in the taxable mineral estate. 
APPEAL, in L. A. No. 29534, from a judgment of the 
Ruperior Court of Los Angeles County, Leon T. David, .Judge. 
]{pversed in part and affirmt'd in part. 
APPEAlJ, in lJ. A. No. 29535, from a judgmrnt of the 
Ruperior Court of Orange County. H. C. Cameron, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Consolidated actions by plaintiff taxpayers to recover taxes 
allegedly based on improper assessments. That portion of 
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judgment for defendants in L. A. No. 29534 dealing with 
assessments of interest under the Standard contract is re-
versed with directions, in all other respects affirmed; judg-
ment for defendant in L. A. No. 29535 affirmed. 
Hanna & Morton, Harold C. Morton, John H. Blake and 
Edward S. Renwick for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
John D. Maharg, County Counsel (Los Angeles), John D. 
Cahill, Deputy County Counsel, Leonard Putnam, Cit.y Attor-
ney, Kenneth K. Williams, Deputy Cit.y Attorney, Hill, Far-
rere & Burrill, Carl A. Stutsman, .Jr., Vincent C. Page, .Jack 
R. White, Keil & Connolly, George A. Connolly, Richard DoJ~, 
Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel (Orange), and Robl'rt F. 
Nuttman, Assistant County. Counsel, for Defendants and 
Appellants and for Defendants and Respondents. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Jay L. Shavelson, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Phillip G. Samovar, Deputy 
Attorney General, as Amici Curiae in L. A. 29534. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In these consolidated appeals plaintiff 
taxpayers seek to recover taxes that they claim were based on 
improper assessments. Both plaintiffs and defendants in L.A. 
29534, appeal from a judgment upholding 46 assessments and 
invalidating three assessments by the County of Los Angeles 
and the City of Long Beach for the tax year of 1963-64. The 
\ State Lands Commission of the State of California appears as 
\amicus curiae in support of two of those plaintiffs. In L.A. 
'29535, plaintiffs appeal from a separate judgment upholding 
37 assessments by the County of Orange for the tax year 1964-
65. 
The facts are not in dispute. By virtue of various docu-
ments, plaintiff oil operators obtained from tax-exempt gov-
ernmental entities rights to drill for and extract oil, gas, and 
other hydrocarbons from specified public lands, together with 
necessary surface occupancy and access rights. The documents 
grant such rights for specified periods and are variously 
denominated leases, orders, permits, agreements, and drilling 
and operating contracts. Each provides that the governmental 
entity owning the property is to receive a percentage or frac-
tion of production payablc ill cash or in kind. 
Plaintiffs' rights in the public lands are admittedly subject 
to ad valorem property taxes as mining rights or mineral 
) 
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rights. Assessors for defendant cities and counties employ the 
capitalization of income method of assessing these rights. 1 
Before 1963 the County of Los Angeles and the City of Long 
Beach assessed such rights by estimating the present value of 
the oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons expected to be recovered 
over the anticipated duration of each agreement and subtract-
ing therefrom (1) the estimated present value of the antici-
pated costs of withdrawing those substances aud (2) the esti-
mated present value of the sums that each plaintiff would be 
required to pay the government entity owning the land in 
money or in kind. The assessed value was derived by multi-
plying the fair market value by the ratio of assessed values to 
fair market values prevailing generally throughout the t.axing 
jurisdiction. Before 1964 the Orange County assessor em-
ployed a substantially similar method.2 Each governmental 
entity then applied the appropriate tax rate to the assessed 
value to compute the taxes.3 
After 1963 in Los Angeles County and the City of Long 
Beach, and after 1964 in Orange County, the assessors no 
longer excluded value attributable to the portion of produc-
tion to be paid to governmental entities in calculating the fair 
market· value of plaintiffs' interests. This change in assess-
ment procedures resulted in a large increase in the assessed 
value of plaintiffs' interests and a corresponding increase in 
their taxes.~ After exhausting their administrative remedies, 
1 With the exception of the City of Long Beach, eaeh defendant city 
has entrusted to the appropriate agencies of defendants Los Angeles 
County and Orange County the tasks of assessing property for purposes 
of municipal taxation, equalizing and correcting assessments, and collect-
ing the taxes. The City of Long Beach assesses and collects its own ad 
valorem taxes. 
2Before 1964 the Ot'ange County assessor employed a procedUre that 
had the same effe<·t of exeJuding value attributable to the portion of pro-
duction to be pnid to government entities. He calculated an assessed 
value per barrel of oil, produced by determining an average weighted 
price per barrel of oil, subtracting a per barrel cost of production there· 
from, /lnd multiplying the result by a capitalization factor adjusted t.o 
refie(·t the ratio of fair market value to assessed value. He then multi-
plied the resulting assessed value per barrel of oil by the difference be· 
tweE'n the estimntp(] number of barrels of oil to be produced and the 
number of barrels equivalent to the value of the payments to the govern-
ment entity OWllir.g the land. 
3Many of the documents gmnting oil rights contain tax provisions. 
Some merely state that plaintiffs are to pay all mineral taxes levied on 
their interests; others provided for sharing the taxes according to the 
respective percentages of proiluction to which each party is entitled. 
"In 1967 the Legislature added sections 107.2 and 107.3 to the Revenue 
and Taxation Coile to define the full cash value of certain leasehold 
estates in exempt property for the produetion of gas, petroleum and other 
\ 
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plaintiffs filed actions seeking recovery of taxes resulting from 
the increased assessments and declaratory relief. In L.A. 
29534, the superior court entered judgment in favor of plain-
tiffs with respect to three assessments of mineral rights 
granted under documents entitled "drilling and operating 
contracts," but otherwise sustained the method of valuation 
employed by the County of Los Angeles assessor and the City 
of Long Beach assessor. In L.A. 29535, the superior court 
sustained the method of valuation employed by the Orange 
County assessor in all cases, including his assessment of rigl1ts 
under a "drilling and operating contract" similar to thosc in 
L.A. 29534. 
Leases, Orders, and Permits 
[Ia] We first consider the instruments, denominated as 
leases,s orders, or permits.6 Each conveys to a lessee the 
exclusive right to drill for and extract oil, gas, and other 
hydrocarbons from beneath specified, publicly owned land, 
together with necessary surface occupancy and access rights. 
Some instruments convey those rights for a fixed term, and 
others for so long as oil and gas are produced in paying 
quantities. Each instrument entitles the lessor to a percentage 
or fraction of production, to be taken either in kind or in 
cash.' 
The nature of the rights created by such instruments is 
hydrocarbon substances. (Stats. 1967. ch. 1684, U 1, 2.) Chapter 1684 
also provided that it should not be construed to affect this litigation. 
(§ 3.) 
IiNine of the leases were granted by the United States Department of 
the Interior. Thirteen were granted by various city and county govern-
ments. Fifteen are" community" leases, granted by adjoining owners of 
relatively small parcels of land, some of whom arc govemmental entities, 
who have pooled their interests so that their holdings may be developed 
jointly. The remainder arc oil and gas leascs grantcd by the State of 
California. 
6Eight of the instruments are denominated "orders" or "perm its" 
from the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. 
The trial court noted that "Because of the trusts upon harbor lund~ 
imposed by the City Charter, sections 141(6), 142 and 143a, the use of 
such lands for drilling and production of oil is under a 'permit' rather 
than a 'lease.' " Since the provisions contained therein are substantially 
identical with those found in leases, we regard the orders and permits as 
being in the same category as leases. (Cf. Dutton v. Interstate Inv. Corp. 
(1941) 19 Ca1.2d 65, 68 [119 P.2d ]38]; Morrow v. Coast Land Co. 
(1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 92, 110·111 [84 P.2d 301 ].) 
'Yost of the instruments allow the lessor to choose the form of pay· 
ment; some require him to take payment in cash. Cash value is based 
upon the current market price of oil, the best price available, or similar 
formulae specified in the agreement. 
I 
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scttled in California. " [T]hc owncr of land does not have an 
absolute title to oil and gas in place as corporeal real 
propt'rty, but, rather, the exclusive right on his premises to 
drill for oil and gas, and to retain as his property all sub-
stances brougllt to the surface on his land." (Oallahan v 
Mar·tin (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 110, 117 [43 P.2d 788, 101 A.L.R. 
871]. See also La Laguna Ranch 00. v. Dodge (1941) 18 
Cal.2d 132, 135 [114 P.2d 351, 135 A.L.R. 546] ; Gerhard v . 
. Stephens (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 864, 879-880 [69 Cal.Rptr. 612, 
442 P.2d 692].) 
Under the instruments llcrein, each public entity granted 
t.he privilege of drilling for and producing oil and gas exclu-
sjvely to a lessee without reservation or exception for the term 
of thc lease. "The right [to drill for and produce oil] wheJ.l 
granted is a profit a prendre, a right to remove a part of the 
substance of the land. [2] A profit a prendrre is an interest 
in real property in the nature of an incorporeal heredita-
ment. . .. The profit a prendre, whcther it is ~nIimited as to 
duration or limited to a term of years, is an i estate in real 
property. If it is for a term of years, it is a chattel real, which 
is nevertheless an estate in real property, although not real 
property; or real estate. [Citation omitted.] Where it is 
unlimited in duration, it is a freehold interest, an estate in 
fee, and real property or real estate." (Dabney-Johnston Oil 
Corp. v. Walden (1935) 4 Ca1.2d 637, 649 [52 P.2d 237]. See 
also Oallahan v. Martin, supra. 3 Cal.2d 110, 118; Gerhard v. 
Stephens, supra, 68 Ca1.2d 864, 879-880.) Each lessor re-
tained a rcversionary intcrest, the right to drill for and pro-
duce oil and gas after tIle period specified in the lease. (Dab-
ney-J ohnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden, supra, 4: Ca1.2d 637, 
647.) [1b] Each lessor also received the right to specified 
oil and gas royalty payments, a right that we have classified 
as an incorporeal hereditament, an interest in land. (See Oal- . 
lahan v. Martin, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 110, 124; Standard Oil 00. v. 
J. 1'. Mills Organization (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 128, 134 [43 P.2d 
797] ; Dabney-Johnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 
637,647.) 
[3] It is scttled, howevcr, "that for purposes of taxation 
the definitions of real property in the revenue and taxation 
laws of the state control whetl1er they conform to definitions 
used for other purposes or not." (Trabue Pittman Oorp. v. 
Oounty of Los Angeles (1946) 29 Ca1.2d 385, 393 [175 P.2d 
512] ; see also San Diego Trust &; Sav. Bank v. Oounty of San 
i 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
\ 
Nov. 1968] ATLANTIC OIL CO. 1). COUNTY OF 
Los ANGELES 
[69 C.2d 585; 72 Cal.Rptr. 886, 446 P.2d 1006] 
595 
Diego (1940) 16 Cal.2d 142, 147 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 
416].) Section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code pro-
vides that" 'Real estate' or 'real property' includes: (a) 
The possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the pos-
session of land. (b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in the 
land, all standing timber whether or not belonging to the 
owner of the land, and all rights and privileges appertaining 
thereto .... ' '8 Plaintiffs' rights in the public lands are 
admittedly subject to ad valorem property taxes as "mining 
rights" or "mineral rights" (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 201, 104, 
607.5), and it is those interests that defendants claim they 
assessed. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the lessors' inter-
ests in land resulting from the rights to royalties are classified 
as real property by state tax laws, and that such interests are 
therefore part of the bundle of rights tbat constitutes the 
llydrocarbon mineral estate for ad valorem tax purposes. 
Accordingly, they conclude that failure to deduct the present 
value of royalty payments in computing the value of theil' 
interests results in taxation to them of rights owned by' tax 
exempt lessors, 
[4] Altbough it is classified under general concepts of 
property law as an incorporeal hereditament and an intert'st 
in land, we conclude tbat the right to receive royalties is not 
classified as real property for purposes of taxation. [5] Sec-
tion 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code defines real 
property to include "all ... minerals ... in the lU1Jd, 
. . . and all rights and privileges appertaining thereto." As 
noted above, in California the right to receive royalties is not 
a right appertaining to minerals "in tbe land." Rather, it is 
an interest in oil and gas when tbey are removed from the 
land and reduced to possession. The purpose of the qualifying 
phrase" in the land" is to differentiate such royalty interests 
in extracted minerals from interests in minerals still in the 
land. 9 Only the latter, which include the right to drill for and 
BSection 2500.17 of the Long Beach Municipal Code contains almost 
identical language. 
9Plaintiil's cite S11effield v. Hogg (1934) 124 Tex. 290, 310 [77 S.W.2d 
1021, 1030] as an example of a contrary construction of an almost idell' 
tical statute. Texas courts, however, have adopted the doctrine of title 
to oil and gas in place, under which the royalty holder owns his percent· 
age sllare of oil and gas in the ground. (See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Daugllerl!l 
(1915) 107 Tex. 226 [176 S.W. 717, L.R.A. 1917F 989]; Sheffield v. 
Hogg, supra, 124 Tex. 290, 298.) An interpretation based on that theory 
is no authority in California, which has rejected the doctrine of title to 
oil and gas in place. (See, e.g., Callallan v. Martin, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 110, 
116·117; Gerhard v. Stephens, supra, 68 Ca1.2d 864, 878.) 
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extract oil and gas from the land, are real property for tax 
purposes.IO 
The history of section 607.5 of the Revenue and Taxation 
Codc also indicates that the I.Jegislature did not include the 
right. to share iu tIle proceeds of oil and gas after they are 
produced as one of the rights and privileges apperhlining to 
minerals in the land. Section 607.5 provides: "In the event 
that a separate assessment of rights and privileges appertain-
ing to mines or minerals and land is made, the descriptive 
words 'mining rights' or 'mineral rights' on the assessment 
role shall include the right to enter in or upon the land for 
the exploration, development, and production of minerals, 
including oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons." On its face, the 
statute does not restrict the meaning of "rights and privileges 
appertaining to mines or minerals and land" to the right to 
enter and produce oil, gas and other hydrocarbons, for the 
"term 'indudes' is ordinarily' a word of enlargement and not 
of limitation." (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 
Ca1.2d 621, 639 [268 P.2d 723].) Section 607.5 was enacted in 
1955, however, apparently in response to two decisions by the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal. In 1953 that court held that 
the term." mining rights" was too vague to include oil rights 
of any kind, and further stated tlmt "Even if any oil rights 
were thought of by the ordinary person, in connection with 
the term 'mining rights,' tIle right of a lessee to enter the 
land and drill for oil would naturally be understood, rather 
lOBefore the early 1940's, many county assessors separately assessed 
royalty rights to oil and gas lessors, thereby implicity classifying such 
rights as real property under section 3617 of the Political Code, the prede· 
cessor of section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Plaintiffs con-
tend that the Legislature adopted this interpretation of the statute by 
frequently reenacting the relevant language in section 3617 without sig· 
Ilificant modification during that period. (Sec, e.g., Stats. 1905, ch. 199, 
§], p. 192; Stats. 1909, eh. 609, §], p. 919; Stats. 192], ch. 177, § I, 
p. 185; Stats. 1925, eh. ] 2, § I, p. 11; Btats. 1929, ch. 54, § I, p. 124.) 
During that period, however, the cases were in conflict, the character of 
rights to subsurface oil WAS unclear lind IIssessors could therefore reason-
ably treat the lessor as the owner of his share of the oil and gas in the 
ground. (Bee, e.g., Graciosa Oil Co. v. C01tnty of Santa Barbara (1909) 
]55 Cal. 140, 145·146 [99 P. 483. 20 L.R.A. N.S. 211]; Associated Oil 
Co. v. County of Orange (1935) ·1 Cn1.App.2d 5, 6 r 40 P.2d 887].) The 
doctrine of title to oil and glls in place was not definitively rejected in 
California until ]935 (see Callahan v. Martin, 81/,pra, 3 Cal.2d 110, 116· 
117), and the Legislature last considered section 104 in 1939, after a 
series of decisions by this court further defining and delineating rights 
to sub-surface oil and gas. Under the circumstances, we cannot assume 
that the Legislature adopted administrative interpretations ot section 
3617 that may have reflected no more than uncertainty as to the nature of 
oil and gas rights. 
\ 
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than the right to share in the proceeds of oil after it is pro-
duced." (Alma Inv. Co. v. Krausse (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 
740,745-746 [256 P.2d 1017].) In 1954 the court again llelo 
that the term "mining rights" did not necessarily includ .... 
"ordinary oil rights." (Estribou v. Alma Inv. Co. (1954) 
126 Cal.App.2d 61, 64 [271 P.2d 176].) Section 607.5 modifif's 
the holdings of these cases. Had the Legislature deemed that 
both nonoperating royalty interests and rights to enter land 
and produce oil and gas are taxable mineral estates, it is 
reasonable to assume that it would have said so by d('fillin~~ 
"mining rights" or "mineral rights" to include both types of 
interests, not just the latter. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that to interpret s('ct.ion 104 to 
exclude royalty interests is inconsistent with section 107 of 
the Revenue and Taxation Code. l1 They point out that in 
specifying the interests in gas, petroleum, and hydrocarbon 
substances that should be placed on the secured roll, section 
107 refers to "incorporeal hereditaments or profits a pren-
dre." They urge that in this context an incorporeal heredita-
ment must be something different from a profit a prendre and 
conclude that the Legislature therefore used tIle \Voros "in-
corporeal hereditament" in section 107 to mean II nonoperat-
ing royalty interest. [6] Section 107, however, deals with 
possessory interests, and its purpose is to distinguish between 
those possessory interests that must be placed 011 t.lle lln8(,-
cured roll and sueh interests that must be placed on the 
secured roll. Accordingly, since a nonoperating royalty inter-
est is not a possessory interest, it is not an incorporeal heredi-
tament within the meaning of section 107. Delaney v. LOll'CI'y 
llSection 107 reads ill part : " 'Possessory iuterests' means the fol-
lowing: (a) Possession of, claim to, or right to the possession of land 
or improvements, except when coupled with ownership of the lalld or 
improvements in the same person. (b) 'faxable improvements 011 tax, 
exempt land. Except as provided in this section, possessory interests shall 
not be considered as sufficient security for the payment of any taxes, 
Leasehold estates for the production of gas, petroleum and other hYllro-
carbon substallces from beneath the surface of tile earth, and other rights 
relating to such substances which constitute incorporeal hereditaments 
or profits a prendre, are sufficient security for the payment of taxcs leviecl 
thereon. Such estates and rights shall not he classified as possessory 
interests, but shall be placed on the secured roll. " Revenue and Taxntion 
Code section 109 provides in part: " 'RolJ' J1ll'aIlS the entire aSSeSSlllOllt 
roll. The' secured roll' is til at part of the roll containing ... prop<'rty 
the taxes on which are a lien on real property sufficient, in the opinion 
of the assessor, to secure payment of the taxes." Revenue and Taxation 
Code section 2187 provides: "Every tax 011 real property is a lien ng:dllst 
the property nssessed." 
I 
! 
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(1944) 25 Cal.2d 561 [154 P.2d 674], is not to the contrary, 
for the court was there concerned solely with the application 
of section 107 to the interests of operating lessees under oil 
and gas leases. 
[7a] Plaintiffs contend that the uniform practice of asses-
sors before 1963 of deducting royalties payable to a tax 
exempt lessor in assessing the value of the lessee's interest 
constitutes a settled administrative interpretation that royalty 
interests are rights and privileges appertaining to minerals in 
the land within the meaning of section 104. Plaintiffs assert 
that it is only because such interests were held by tax exempt 
lessors, that assessors in the past did not include their value 
as part of the total t..uable value of the mineral estate. Plain-
tiffs conclude that we should give controlling weight to tllis 
administrative interpretation. 
As pointed out above (see fn. 10, supra) the assessors' 
practice of treating royalty interests as taxable real property 
under section 104 may have arisen out of uncertainty as to the 
theory of the ownership of oil and gas rights. After that 
theory was clarified in the 1930's, there was no compelling 
need for assessors to reconsider their assessment practices 
until this court's decision in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of 
San Diego (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 546, 566-570 [290 P.2d 544], dis-
approving the valuation methods approved in Blinn Lbr. Co. 
v. County of Los Angeles (1932) 216 Cal. 468 [14 P.2d 516], 
and Blinn Lbr. Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1932) 216 Cal. 
474 (14 P.2d 512, 84 A.L.R. 1304]. (See also Texas Co. v. 
County of Los A.·ngeles (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 55, 59-61 [338 P.2d 
440].) In the case of privately owned land, the entire value of 
the mineral estate is taxable, and liability for the payment of 
taxes between the lessor and lessee is a subjeet for agreement 
between them. Aecordingly, it is essentially only a matter of 
bookkepping whether the assessor assesses the entire mineral 
estate to the lessee or lessor or assesses their interests sepa-
rately. In the case of land owned by tax exempt entities, 
under the rule of the Blinn cases, the value of the royalty 
interest was deducted in assessing the value of the taxable 
lessee's interest, and it was therefore immaterial to the 
assessor whether or not the royalty interest would have been 
taxable under section 104 had the lessor not been tax exempt. 
rl'he decision in the De Luz case made the question of such 
taxability material, for royalty interests could no longer be 
deducted uuder the valuation rule of the Blinn cases and the 
question therefore arose whether royalty interests should be 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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deducted as separate interests in real property under section 
104. Even if we assume that the failure of assessors to apply 
the De Lllz case to oil and gas leases for eight years after it 
was decided was not the result of inertia, but constituted an 
administrative interpretation that royalty interests are tax-
able under section 104 unless they are held by a tax 
exempt entity, that interpretation would not be binding. 
[8] "[A]lthough contemporaneous construction by officials 
charged with the administration of a statute or ordinance is 
given great weight, 'final responsibility for the interpretation 
of the law rests with the courts. "At most administrative 
practice is a weight in the scale, to be considered but not to be 
inevitably followed.'" (Whitcomb Hotel v. California EtlIp. 
Com., 24 Cal.2d 753,756-757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405], 
quoting from F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 
973.) [7b] The rule of contemporaneous construction may 
not be applied when tIle wording of the statute or ordinance, 
as in the present case, clearly calls for a different construc-
tion. (California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 
Cal.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028].)" (John-
ston v. Board of Supervisors (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 66, 74-75 [187 
P.2d 686]; see also GoodwiU Industries v. County of Los 
Angeles (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 19,26 [254 P.2d 877].) 
[9] We conclude that a landowner's royalty interest 
under an oil and gas lease or similar agreement is not real 
property within the meaning of section 104 and that therefore 
failure to deduct its value in assessing the interest of a lessee 
of tax exempt land does not result in imposing a tax on tax 
exempt property. 
[10] The remaining issues involve the valuation of plain-
tiffs' various operating interests. Defendants base their re-
fusal to deduct the present value of future royalty payments 
in assessing plaintiffs' interests on DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. 
County of San Diego, supra, 45 Cal.2d 546, and Texas Co. v. 
County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Ca1.2d 55. Although each of 
those cases involved a surface lease and the question of the 
deductibility of the present value of the lessor's right to 
receive rent in assessing the value of the lessee's possessory 
interest in tax exempt land, their rationale applies also to. the 
question of the deductibility of the present value of royalty 
interests in assessing plaintiffs' rights to produce oil and gas 
under their leases and similar agreements with the owners of 
tax exempt land. 
I 
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We recognized in the De Luz case that the capitalization of 
ineome method is a "generally accepted method of valuing 
propcrty from which income may be or is derived." (45 
Ca1.2d 546, 564.)12 In both the De Luz and Texas Co. cases 
WI' held that in valuing a surface lease by the capitalization of 
inc·ome method, future rents are not to be deducted in arriv-
ing at a net income figure. (45 Ca1.2d 546, 566; 52 Cal.2d 55, 
60-62.) [11] "Taxation of propcrty at its value without 
regard to tlle owner's equity therein is an established .princi-
pIe of ad valorem taxation. [12] Thus, a conditional 
vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at the full value of property 
as its owner even though he could realize little or nothing by 
its sale. (S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569-570 [90 
IJ.Ed. 851, 859-860, 66 S.Ct. 749] ; Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Cal.2d 
637,643 [192 P.2d 5]; DcLuz Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San 
J)iego,45 Cal.2d 546, 573 [290 P.2d 544].) [13] The con-
tinued enjoyment of the benefits of ownership of the fee or a 
possessory interest is dependent on discharging the obliga-
tions assumed to secure such benefits, and there is no logical 
basis for treating those obligations differently as they happen 
to run to a lessor, a conditional vendor, or a mortgagee." 
(Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 
62.) 
The analogy between rents and royalties is well settled. 
[14] ., Rent paid for a leasehold interest ... is part of the 
cost or purchase price of the lca.~ehold, . . . .. (De Luz 
Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San Diego, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 546, 
567.) "'Rent is a compensation paid for the use of land. It 
need not be money. Any chattels or products of the soil serve 
the purpose equally as well. . . .' (Clarke & Oaine v. Oobb, 
121 Cal. 595, 597 [54 P. 74]; ... )" (Silveira v. Ohm (1949) 
33 Ca1.2d 272,276 [201 P.2d 387].) [15] Similarly, royalty 
payments are considl'ration to the lessor for the uses of land 
12< < According to this method, the value of property is the sum of 
anticipated future installments of net income from the property, less an 
allowance for interest and the risk of partial or no receipt .... The first 
step in the process is to d<>terminc prospective net income and this is 
done by estimating future gross income and deducting therefrom expected 
nccess:n'y expenseR incidcnt to maintcnan"e and operation of the prop-
erty .... Since it is generally accepted tlmt a person who agrees to 
receive payment in th(' future is entitled to interest both for waiting and 
the risk of partial or no receipt, the second step is to discount each future 
installment of income by a rate of interl'st that takes into account the 
llazards of the iuvestment aud tIll' ae.cepted eoncl'pts of a 'fair return.' 
The sum of the discollnted installments is the present value of the prop-
erty." (De Luz Ho'1l'cs, 17lc. v. County of San Diego, aupra, 45 Ca1.2d 
546, 564-565.) 
I 
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allowed by contract. "Under the usual oil and gas lease the 
owner confers on the lessee for the term of the lease an exclu-
sive right of profit to drill for and produce oil, the lessee 
usually returning to the lessor for the privilpge grantrd a rent 
or royalty measured by a fraction of the oil produced." 
(Dabney-J ohnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 637, 
649; see also Standard Oil Co. v. J. P. Mills Organization, 
supra, 3 Cal.2d 128, 134-135.) Thus in Callahan v. Martin, 
supra, 3 Ca1.2d 110, 123, the case in which we rejected the 
theory of ownership of oil and gas in place, we recognized 
that "royalty return . . . is rent, or so closely analogous as 
to partake of the incidents thereof." [16] "The words 
'royalty' and 'rent' ... 'are used interchangeably to convey 
the same meaning'; i.e., 'the compensation which the occnpier 
pays the landlord for that species of occupation which the 
contract between them allows' (Nelson v. Republic Iron d\-
o SteeZ Co. (1917) 240 F. 285, 291, 293 [153 C.C.A. 211] ; Elsi-
nore Oil Co. v. Signal Oil etc. Co. (1935) 3 Cal.App.2d 570, 
573 [40 P.2d 523])." (Denio v. City of Huntington Beach 
(1943) 22 Cal.2d 580,596 [140 P.2d 392, 149 A.L.R. 3201.) In 
this respect it is immaterial that the lessor obtains title to 
royalty oil and gas as soon as it is produced at the wellhead, 
whereas rental payments are usually made from funds initial-
ly owned by the lessee. [17] The owner of land has no title 
to oil and gas in place but only the exclusive right to produce 
it from his land. When he conveys that right to a lessee in 
exchange for the right to receive a fraction of the oil and gas 
produced, his royalty interest, like the right to receive rent 
pursuant to other kinds of leases, flows from the agreement of 
the parties. The fact that the oil and gas would have been the 
lessor's personal property had there been no lease and had the 
oil and gas been produced by him does not change the charac-
ter of his relationship with the lessee or the nature of the 
royalty payment as compensation for the use of land. Is 
'Ve turn now to certain leases and agreements that differ in 
various respects from the leases, orders, and permits consid-
ered above. 
The Rancho Park Lease of Land Owned by the City of Los 
Angeles. 
[lSa] In 1946 the city assigned to the United States of 
America" six and one-quarter percent (6% %) of the amount 
lSPlaintiffs also suggest that the right to receive future rents is not 
analOirouB to the right to receive future royalties beca.use the latter may 
! 
\ 
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or value of any oil and gas ... that may be produced from 
that certain property .... " In 1957 the city entered into a 
35-year oil and gas lease with Signal Oil and Gas Company 
and Richfield Oil Corporation as co-lessees. Under its terms 
the lessees are required to pay the city a 1/5 royalty pws 50 
percent of net profits after payout. The lease expressly pro-
vides that" the United States of America is the owner of six 
and one-quarter per cent (614%) of the amount or value of 
any oil and gas that may be produced from the demised 
property except that used on the demised property, and 
... the royalty of one-fifth (1/5) herein reserved ... to the 
Lessor includes such an amount or value." 
Plaintiffs contend that any analogy between the ·royalty 
payments to the United States and surface rentals of the type 
involved ill the De Luz and 1'exas Co. cases is fallacious on 
the ground that such royalty payments under the lease cannot 
be classified as part of the purchase price paid by the lessees to 
the United States. -We do not agree with this contention_ As a 
, result of the 1946 assig-nment, which was made before the oil 
I and gas lease was executed, the City of Los Angeles and the 
United States of America were tenants in common in the 
exclusive rigllt to drill for and produce oil and gas from the 
land. (See Little v. Mounia'in View Dairies, Inc. (1950) 35 
Ca1.2d 232, 234 [217 1'.2d 416] ; Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. V. 
Walden, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 637, 649.) [19] TIle United 
States did not sign the 1957 lease, but a single cotenant may 
confer occupancy rights upon a third person. (Lee Chuck V. 
Quan W 0 Chong & Co. (1891) 91 Cal. 593, 598-599 (28 P. 45] ; 
Verdier v. Verdier (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 348,352 [313 P.2d 
123].) [20] Furthermore, when one tenant in common 
makes an oil and gas lease, it binds the other tenants in co-
mon who ratify the lease, and acceptance of benefits under the 
lease constitutes ratifieation. (Bessho v. General Petrole1(tI£ 
(!orp. (1921) 186 Cal. 133,141 [199 P. 22] ; see also Little v. 
Mountain View Dai1-ies, Inc., in/pm, 35 Cal.2d 232, 235.) 
he assigned ill pc'-petuity and may thereforc survive tllC oil and gas leases 
!'xisting at the time of the assignment.. WIlen a landowner makes an oil 
nntl gas lease 'lIld then assigns in perpetnity Ids right to rcceive r.yalty 
pnYlllcnts, he eonw'ys his right to n'ccive ,-oyalty payments for thc period 
of the lease and also part of his reversionary interest in the profit 
/I /1/'c/1I1re_ (Cal/alum v. Mllrlill, supra, 3 Cal.2d 110, 124; DalnlCy-Jo7tn-
.,Iou O-H Corp. v. WuldclI, supm, 4 Cal.2d 637, 649; Schiffman V. Rich-
fidt/ Oil Co. (W:\7) S Cal.:!t! 21 J. :!:l:l 164 1'.2<1 ] 081]; I.a Lai/ulla Runch 
Co. v_ J)o<7!Je, slIpra, 18 Cal.2d ] :12, ] 36.) A lanllowncr who hns the right 
to r"ceh-c rClltH frolll a snrfnce l!'llSC may also :lssign both Ilis right to 
r('r('ivc ,-('nt and his revcrsionary intcr!'st. 
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[lSb] Plaintiffs arc therefore obligated to make royalty pay-
ments to co-lessors instead of to a single lessor; their obliga-
tion to pay a 6% percent royalty to the United States consti-
tutes part of the eonsideration for their right to produce oil 
and gas from the land. 
The Compensatory Royalty Agreement 
[21] The State of California owns land adjacent to pri-
vately owned land upon which the Hancock Oil Company had 
an oil and gas lease. Under the terms of the compensatory 
royalty agreement, the state promised that it would not drill, 
or permit others to drill, any well for the production of oil 
and gas on its land; in return, Hancock agreed to pay the 
state 1.448 percent of all oil produced and sold from wells 
drilled under its lease on the adjoining privately owned land. 
The state also grantrd Hancock an easement and rights of 
way on the state-owned land, exercisable at any time for any 
of Hancock's operatiolls 1,lllder its lease on the adjoining pri-
vately owned land. 
Plaintiff Signal Oil and Gas Corporation, the successor in 
interest to Hancock, contends that any analogy between the 
royalty payments to the state and surface rentals of the type 
involved in the De Luz and Texas Co. cases is fallacious on 
the ground that payments under the compensatory royalty 
agreement cannot be classified as part of the purchase price 
for the right to produce oil and gas from privately owned 
land. Under the compensatory royalty agreement, however, 
Signal obtained interests in the state-owned land-the right 
to exclude others from drilling any well for the production of 
oil and gas on that land, and an easement and rights of way 
over the land. The royalty payments are compensation for 
those interests in land, and as such are analogous to rental 
payments under the De Luz rule. 
Drilling and Operating Contracts 
In L.A. 29534, the trial court held invalid the assessments 
of plaintiffs' interests under their drilling and operating con-
tracts on the ground that the royalty interests should have 
been deducted in making those assessments. Those contracts 
are the Standard contract between plaintiff Standard Oil 
Company and the Los Angeles County Flood Control Dis-
trict; the Termo contract between plaintiff Termo Company 
and the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Long 
Beach, and the Humble contract between plaintiff Hunlble Oil 
I: 
I 
i: 
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& Refining Company and the Board of Harbor Commissioners 
of the City of Long Beach. The trial court concluded that 
('Mil contract crf'atrd a tenancy in common between the 
parties in the respective taxable mineral interests, and that 
plaillt ifl's were therefore erroneously taxed for property 
owned in part by tax exempt entities. 
[22a] 1. The Standard contract. Plaintiff Standard Oil 
Company is the successor in interest of Continental Corpora-
tion, which entered into the Standard contract in 1939 for 
"twenty (20) years ... and so long thereafter as oil, gas 
and/or other hydrocarbon substances is or are produced from 
said lands in paying quantities." The instrument refers to 
plaintiff as "contractor," and the preamble states that the 
Los Angeles County Flood Control District "desires to 
employ an~ engage contractor to drill, develop and operate" 
for the recovery of hydrocarbons. Plaintiff agrees to drill and 
operate a minimum of eigllt wells on sites it selects, and such 
additional wells as in its judgment will properly drain the 
land. Plaintiff has tll~ exclusive right to drill for and ·produce 
oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons, and the exclusive right to 
enter the land for such purposes and for construction and 
maintenance of necessary equipment and structures. Plaintiff 
may terminate drilling operations on all or any part of the 
premises, subject only to termination of its rights respecting 
that portion of the premises. It controls production, and may 
comply with any regulation affecting production when, in its 
judgment, such action is in the best interests of both parties. 
It is authorized to incur a variety of expenses incident to the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the agreement, but such 
expenses are subject to reimbursement only from the proceeds 
of the sale of production. It promises not to permit liens 
against the premises and agrees to hold the district harmless 
if any are filed, and it must provide liability and fire insur-
ance. It has the right to take part in any litigation. All 
hydrocarbons produced are the property of the district until 
sold by it, and the parties specifically note their intent to 
withhold from plaintiff any interest in the hydrocarbon prod-
ucts or the land.14 Plaintiff, however, has the exclusive right 
and obligation to buy all the production from the district, at 
14".A 1l oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons in, under or from the said 
properties whether in place in the gronnd, in storage, or otherwise, shall 
be and remain the property of District lit all times until Bold or otherwise 
disposed of by or for it i it being the particular intent of the parties 
) 
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which time title passes to plaintiff. After deducting expenses 
from the proceeds of sales, plaintiff agrees to pay the uistrict 
a percentage of production as set forth in an attacheu sched-
ule, "and shall retain the then balance as and for compensa-
tion for its services. . .. " 
The Standard contract does not create a tenancy in common 
in the taxable mineral interest in real property. [23] As 
noted above, the taxable mineral interest consists of the right 
to drill for and produce hydrocarbons. A tenancy in common 
in that interest in real property exists only if both tenants 
have a unity of possession in the same estate (Meyer v. Supe-
rior Oourt (1927) 200 Cal. 776, 792 [254 P. 1108] ; Dabncy-
Johnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Cal.2d 637, 655), anu 
the i:ntention to create such unity of possession must clearl.v 
appear. (La Laguna Ranch 00. v. Dodge, supra, 18 Cal.2d 
132, 138.) [24] When a landowner conveys to another the 
exclusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons in 
return for some part of the production or its cash equivalent, 
he does not thereby become a tenant in common in the profit a 
prendre, for he has not indicated an intention to :retain the 
right to take part in the extraction of hydrocarbons. The 
Standard contract grants plaintiff the exclusive right to drill 
for and produce oil and gas and nowhere indicates that the 
district intended to grant plaintiff less than the full profit a 
prendre. [25] An agreement to share or retain title to the 
oil and gas when reduced to possession does not constitute an 
agreement to share the taxable mineral interest in the real 
property.lIi [22b] The facts that the instrument is labelled 
a drilling and operating agreement rather than a lease, that 
plaintiff is labelled a contractor who is to be paid for services 
performed, and that the parties disclaim any intent to grant 
hereto that nothing in this agreement shall be construed to give to Con-
traetor, and that Contractor shall not under or by virtue of this agree-
ment aequire, any interest in said lands nor in the oil, gas or other hydro-
carbons produced therefrom." 
lliThe Standard contract was the subject of litigation in County of Los 
..4.ngeles v. Continental Corp. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 207 [248 P.2d 157]. 
The court there rejected the argument that the title retention clause evi-
denced an intent to relegate the contractor to the position of an agent. 
" 'Nor is it of any consequence that here the agreement undertakes to 
provide that title to the products produced by the defendant shall remain 
in the district until paid for by it. When considered in the light of the 
provision that the defendant alone may purchase such produds and it i8 
obligated so to do, this provision . . . would seem to be nothing more 
than a method Or device designed to secure pnynH'nt to the district of 
the royalty or rental herein reserved to it.' " (P. 227.) 
) 
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an interest in property, do not control the legal effect of the 
instrument.16 Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding 
invalid the assessments of plaintiff's interests under the Stan-
dard contract. 
2. The Ternw and Humble Contracts. Plaintiff Termo Com-
pany entered into a drilling and operating agreement with the 
Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Long Beach in 
1939 to drill a well to drain land adjacent to that included in 
a 1938 oil and gas permit. The parties combined all previous 
agreements in an amended drilling and operating agreement 
in 1961. The purpose of the 1961 amendment was to enable the 
parties to commit the land, located within that segment of the 
Wilmington Oil Field designated as Fault Block IV, to agree-
ments with other holders of oil and gas interests whereby the 
entire FauJt Block would be operated as one geological unit 
by a 'single common agent.17 The amended agreement became 
effective when the parties entered into a Unit Agreement and 
a Unit Operating Agreement with other parties. 
Plaintiff Humble Oil & Refining Company is the successor 
ill interest to 'Vestgate-Greenland Oil Company, which en-
tered into an oil and gas permit with the board in 1938 and 
a drilling and operating agreement with the board in 1939, 
and General American Oil Company of Texas, which entered 
into an amended drilling and operating contract in 1961 in 
contemplation of the commitment of the land to tne Fault 
Block IV agreements. Humble subsequently signed the Unit 
Agreement and Unit Operating Agreement. 
The 1939 Termo drilling and operating agreement contains 
many provisions similar to those in the Standard contract. 
The agreement states that the city, having previously granted 
16In County of Los Angeles v. Continental Oorp., 8'Upra, 113 Ca1.App.2d 
207, 226, the court stated: " '. • • While denominated by the parties as 
a "drilling and operating agreement" rather than as a lease, this is 
of no particular significance, for it is elementary that the designation 
which the parties to an agreement see fit to affix to it is not eon trolling 
as to its legal effect. (Halll1ntnld Lbr. 00. v. County of LOB Angeles, 
104 Cal.App. 235, 240 [285 P. 896].) Disregarding mere form, certain 
it is tllnt it vests in the defendant the exclusive rigllt, for a term of 
years, "to drill for alld produce oil and other substances" from beneath 
the surface of the land tllerein described. In this aspect at least it differs 
in no respect from the usual oil and gas lease and tile court concludes 
that it is SUbstantially tile equivalent thereof.' " 
17Ullit operation was required to repressurize the land within the Fault 
Block by water injection in order to arrest or ameliorate land subsidence, 
and to increase the maximum economic quantity of bydrocarbons ulti-
mately recoveraLle by ending wasteful competitive drilling practices. 
(See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 3315-3347.) 
) 
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Termo the exclusive right to drill for a.nd produce hydrocar-
bons, now employs Termo as an independent contractor to 
drill and operate another well for a 25-year term. The parties 
disclaim any intention of engaging Termo as anything but a 
"contractor," or of granting Termo any interest in the land 
or hydrocarbons produced. The city retains title to hydrocar-
bons until they are sold. Termo agrees either to provide a 
purchaser for or to purchase itself all of the production. As 
compensation for its services, the city agrees to pay Termo 40 
percent of the consideration paid by purchasers of the hydro-
carbons produced. The city's liability for payment ceases, 
however, when it authorizes the purchaser to pay Tenno, and 
all expenses of production are to be borne by Termo. Provi-
sions follow dealing with written consent for assignment of 
Termo's rights, mechanic's lieris, workmen's compensation, 
insurance, and notice of litigation. 
The 1939 agreement also contains several provisions tllat 
are not included in the Standard contract. Termo agrees to 
complete the original or any substitute well within 120 days 
of the commencement of drilling operations uuless the city 
gives written authorization for the continuance of operations. 
The city may determine whether further drilling would be 
unsuccessful and unproductive at the drillsite, and if it so 
finds, may give written consent to the complete abandonment 
of drilling operations without any requirement tha.t a substi-
tute well be drilled. In the event of possible drainage, the city 
may order Termo to open or perforate a well so as to produce 
from additional zones, or to drill additional wells. The city 
may prevent Termo from placing a casing into the bore-hole 
of any well if it determines that such casing does not conform 
to its specifications or if it disapproves of Termo's proposed 
cementing and perforating program, and may submit the issue 
to arbitration if no agreement is reached. The city may 
assume control in extinguishing fires and controlling oil well 
blowouts. Finally, Termo cannot alter the casing or producing 
zone without the city's advance written consent. 
The 1961 amendment to the Termo drilling and operating 
contract extends the previous contracts for 25 years. The 
amendment recites that the city has heretofore granted Termo 
the exclusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons 
from beneath specified lands, and that it is not feasible for 
Termo to enter into Fault Block IV unit agreements without 
first amending and modifying previous agreements. The 
) 
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amendIDent states, among other provisions not relevant here: 
"4. EFFECT OF UNITIZATION. Said Contracts are hereby modi-
fied and amended to the extent necessary to make Said Con-
tracts conform to all of the terms and conditions of Fault 
Block IV United Agreements. 5. UNIT PARTICIPATION. All 
present interests under Said Contracts are converted to a 
working interest basis. City's interest under Said Contracts is 
converted into sixty-five percent (65%) of the working inter- I 
est in one hundred percent (100%) of the production of oil, 1 
gas and other hydrocarbons allocated to Said Lands located in 
Fault Block IV, and Contractors' interest under Said Con- - -
tracts is converted into thirty-five percent (35%) of the work- , 
ing interest in one hundred percent (100%) of the production 
of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons allocated to Said IJands 
located in Fault Block IV."18 
The 1961 Humble amended drilling and operating contract 
integrates all previous contracts between Humble and the 
city. It contains provisions substantial1y similar to the provi-
sions of the 1961 amendment to.theTermo drilling and oper-
ating agreement and to those provisions of the 1939 Termo 
agreement that resemble the provisions of the Standard con-
tract.11 In addition, the city's written approval of proposed 
drillsites selected by Humble is required. In conducting oper-
ations for the joint account of the parties, Humble may only 
make such surveys and tests, and land and place such well 
casing, as both parties agree upon. No well may be drilled, 
redrilled, reworked, plugged back, deepened, or altered with-
out the consent of both parties. After Humble's refusal to 
join in any such operation, however, the city may do such 
laThe recital to the amended contract also states: "It is the desire of 
the parties that City's present interest under Said Contracts "ill be eon-
verted into sixty-five percent (650/0) of the working interest in one hun-
dred percent (1000/0) of thc working interest in Said Lands, and Con-
tractor's interest undcr Said Contracts will be converted into thirty-five 
percent (350/0) of the working interest in one hundred percent (100%) 
of the working interest in Said Lands and Contractors will advance City's 
sixty-five percent (65%) of the expenses as a working interest owner and 
will be reimbursed therefor out of one bundred percent (1000/0) of the 
production of oil, gas and othcr hydrocarbon substances allocated to Said 
Lands ..•. " 
19Some minor differences should bc noted. Humble agrees to drill and 
operate fourteen wells and such additional wells as are authorized. The 
city retains title to hydrocarbons underlying the land until recovered, 
subject to Humble's exclusive rigllt to drill for, produce, and take the 
same, and to the city's rights of ownership when produced . .As compen-
sation for its services, Humble receives 35 percent of production; 65 per-
cent of Humble'. expenses are payable out of the city'. share of pro-
duction. 
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work at its own expense. Humble has similar rights to drill or 
conduct other major operations without the city's consent, 
but only if fewer than 14 wells are open to production. If 
eitller party contends that a redrilling or other major opera-
tion will jeopardize existing production, the matter may be 
submitted to arbitration. No well may be plugged or aban-
doned without the consent of both parties. Equipment, per-
sonal property, and fixtures are owned jointly by the parties, 
65 percent by the city and 35 percent by Humble, and Hum-
ble cannot sell or dispose of such items without the city's 
prior written consent. 
The Unit Agreement signed in 1961 by the city, plaintiffs, 
and other parties defines "working interest" to mean "any 
interest, . . . held in lands by virtue of fee title, including 
lands held in trust, or by virtue of any lease, operating agree-
ment or otherwise, under or pursuant to which the owner of . 
such interest has the right to drill for, develop and produce 
oil and gas. For the purposes of this agreement a Working 
Interest shall be deemed to be vested in the owner thereof 
even though his right to drill or produce may be delegated to 
a Field Contractor, or an operator under a drilling and oper-
ating agreement ... or other type of agreement." Section 
4.3 of the Unit Agreement provides that "Working Interest 
Owners through the Unit Coordinator or the Unit Operators 
shall have the right to conduct such operations as they may 
from time to time Approve as necessary or desirable to pro-
duce efficiently and economically the Unitized Substances, to 
increase the ultimate recovery of Unitized Substances, to pre-
vent waste, or to contribute to the possible arrest or ameliora-
tion of Subsidence, including but not limited to Repressuring 
Operations in and with respect to the Unitized Formations. 
• • .' '20 The powers of the Unit Operator as set forth in the 
Unit Agreement and the Unit Operating Agreement include 
20Section 8.2 of the Unit Agreement further provides that, except for 
the right to erect noninterfering facilities for taking oil in kind, ". . . 
no Person other than the Working Interest Owners, acting through the 
Unit Coordinator and Unit Operators, shall have any right by reason 
of this agreement or the Unit Operating Agreement to conduct any oper· 
ations or install any facilities on any Committed Tract .... " Section 4.1 
of the Unit Operating Agreement provides: "The Working Interest 
Owners shall exercise over·all supervision and control of all matters per-
taining to the repressuring, development and operation [of t.he unitized 
Jands] ... and shall make such Determinations and grant such Ap-
provals as they may deem appropriate for the supervision and direction 
of the Unit Coordinator and the Unit Operators." 
• C.Jd-ao 
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"the exclusive right to develop and operate the Unit Segment 
designated for it in the Unit Operating Agreement in accord-
ance with the provisions thereof," the right "to enter into 
such agreements as are desirable or necessary to carry out the 
purposes" of the Unit Agreement,21 and the right, subject 
to approval of the working interest owners, to "employ its 
own tools and equipment in the drilling or redrilling of Unit 
Wells .... " Matters to be voted on by working interest 
owners include all aspects of exploration, development, and 
produetion.22 The prescribed voting procedure gives each 
working interest owner a voting interest equal to its percent-
age interest in the entire tract committed to unit operations. 
Most of the provisions of the 1939 Termo drilling and oper-
ating agreement are substantially similar to the provisions of 
the Standard contract, and do not indicate any intent to 
create a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral interest.23 
[26] Amicus curiae contends, however, that the provisions 
of the 1939 Termo agreement that are not contained in the 
Standard contract and the provisions of the 1961 Humble 
agreement that are not contained in the Standard contract 
and that do not relate to unitization indicate a sharing of 
responsibilities for exploration, development, and production 
even prior to unitization. Amicus Curiae further contends 
that the provisions and agreements relating to unitization 
demonstrate an intent to create tenancies in common in the 
taxable mineral interest. 
We do not agree that the provisions of the Termo agree-
ment and the Humble agreement that do not relate to unitiza-
21The Unit Operator may enter agreements to repressure or maintain 
pressures within the unitized formations, to prevent oil or gas migration, 
to prevent dminage or waste, and •• to permit the use of any lands or 
facilities for oil and gas operations by or in conjunction with any other 
Persons, " as well as for other purposes. 
22The matteI's to he approved or determined by the working interest 
owners include the kind, character and method of unit operations and rate 
of production; the type, method, and length of repressuring operations; 
any expenditure over $20,000; the drilling, repair, abandonment, or 
alteration of any unit well; and the negotiation, execution, and perform-
ance of agreements necessary or desirable for the performallce of the 
Unit Agreement. 
23 Amicus curiae contends that the provisions for purchase or sale of 
the oil and gas produced and the express retention of title to such hydro-
carbons by the city show clear intention to create a tenancy in common 
in the taxable mineral interest because the city retains rights normally 
granted to a lessee. The rights to hydrocarbons when produced that are 
retained by the city, however, do not detract from the taxable mineral 
estate, namely, the exelusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons 
. from beneath the surface of public lands for a term of years. 
) 
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tion indicate an intention to create tenancies in common in 
the taxable mineral interests. They indicate instead an int('n-
tion to grant plaintiffs a profit a prendre subjeet to conditions 
and controls retained by the city to assure that publicly 
owned oil resources are developed in a manner that will best 
serve the public interest. The taxable mineral inter('st consists 
of the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons. Thc 
instruments grant that interest exclusively to plaintiffs for a 
25-year period, with a reversion thereafter to the city. 
Although the controls retained by the city allow it to super-
vise operations for its own protection, they do not allow it to 
undertake such operations itself.24 Retention of opcrational 
checks adequate to assure maximum public benefit from pri-
vate development of public resources is common. We note, for 
example, that the California Public Resources Code requires 
the state to include similar provisions in state oil and gas 
leases. (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 6829, 6830.) Such con-
trols serve not only to maximize return to the public, but also 
to assure that public land leased to private individuals will 
continue to serve a publie purpose. (See, e.g., Health & Saf. 
Code, §§ 33336, 33439; City & County 01 Ban Francisco v. 
Ross (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 52,57-58 [279 P.2d 529] ; Ventura Port 
Dist. v. Taxpayers etc. Ventura Port Dist. (1959) 53 Cal. 
2d 227,234-235 [1 Cal.Rptr.169, 347 P.2d 305].) 
[27] We conclude, however, that the unit agreements and 
the provisions of the 1961 instruments that refer to unitiza-
tion create tenancies in common in the respective taxable 
mineral interests in land. By those instruments and provi-
sions the city adjusted its relationship with each of the plain-
tiffs involved so that the previously granted exclusive rights 
to drill for and produce oil and gas would be delegated to a 
common agent. That agent's operations are subject to control 
by vote of "working interest" owners, both the city and the 
24Paragraph 7 of the Humble contract provides that if Humble refuse>! 
to drill, redrill, rework, deepen, plug blll!k, or alter a well, the eity may 
carry out the operation at its own expense. If tbe city elects to drill 11 
well, Humble agrees to operate the· well, and to surrender its sbare of 
the bydrocarbons produced until its share of dl'illillg expenses bas been 
recovered. Provisions for redrilling and. otber operations include the right 
to arbitration if either party feels tbat tbe source of supply from whieb 
the well is then producing will be shut off or jeopardized. Considered in 
the context of the entire contract, the provisions of paragraph 7 merely 
provide another control provision in the e\'ent that Humble fails to meet 
its obligation to maximize prouuction from the tract, and are not meant 
to create a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral interest. 
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plaintiff involved are working interest owners, and both vote 
in proportion to their adjustcd interests and their relative 
interests in the entire tract committed to unit operation. The 
right to drill for and produce oil and gas, which comprises the 
taxable mineral interest, is no longer held exclusively by a 
single oil contractor. Rather, both the plaintiff involved and 
the city control the drilling and production of oil and gas on 
the subject land in proportion to their voting rights in the 
unit, and each has subscribed to that unity of possession 
required to create a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral 
estate. 
Defendants contend, however, that as between the city and 
each of the plaintiffs involved, the plaintiff continued to own 
the entire profit a prendre, and that it is only for unit pur-
poses that each party votes in proportion to its unit participa-
tion. Defendants urge that the purpose of unitization is to 
prevent subsidence and that the voting arrangements created 
by the unit agreements were intended to give the city a voice 
within the unit only to protect the public interest in the 
cnrrying out of the ullitization program. Defendants conclude 
that ullitization should not affect the taxable property inter-
ests of the parties. Although some provisions of the unit 
agreements indicate the wish of the parties to avoid tax conse- __ 
qnences, to achieve unitization they agreed to share full con-
trol over the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons, the 
right that comprises the taxable mineral estate. Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly concluded that the city became a 
tenant in common with Termo and Humble and that the lat-
ters' interests should be assessed accordingly. 
The part of the judgment in L.A. 29534 dealing with the 
assessments of interests under the Standard contract is 
reversed and the trial court is directed to amend its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in accord with the views 
expressed herein and to enter judgment for defendaqts as to 
those assessments. In all other respects the judgment in L.A. 
29534 is affirmed. The judgment in L.A. 29535 is affirmed. 
Dcfendants shall recover their costs on these appeals. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
The petition of the plaintiffs and appellants for a rehearillg 
was denied December 18, 1968. . 
